NOTES
A JUDICIAL PROCESS STUDY OF THE] REVIEW
OF LICENSING DECISIONS OF THE PEiNNSYLVANIA
LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD
The majority's misconception of the power of the Board
... demonstrate[s] the court's lack of competence in licensing
matters and is so damaging to the orderly grant of licenses for the
sale of liquor at retailthat the legislature should immediately enact
remedial legislation.'
Effective judicial review of administrative determinations depends on
both legislative direction and judicial discretion. The review processes
of state appellate courts, unlike their federal counterparts, have only infrequently been intensely scrutinized. In a small effort to fill this gap, this
Note will analyze, as an example, the Pennsylvania judiciary's review of
2
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's (PLCB) licensing decisions.
The following questions suggest the nature of the inquiry. Do the Pennsylvania courts properly defer to statutory allocations of discretionary
power to the board? Have they developed consistent principles to govern
similar substantive and scope of review problems? To what extent do the
courts give effect to policy considerations basic to the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code? Attention will be given to the way in which the courts use
authorities. Observations will also be made concerning the effectiveness
of present channels for review of board determinations, including the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's selection and disposition of cases under its
discretionary allocatur jurisdiction.n Although criticism of the substantive
law is an inevitable by-product, the primary intent is to study judicial
method.

I.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

A. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
The board is comprised of three members, appointed by the Governor
and subject to the approval of two-thirds of the State senate.4 Of central

I Willowbrook Country Club, Inc., Liquor License Case, 409 Pa. 370, 376, 187
A.2d 154, 157 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
2The bulk of state-wide agencies come within the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Administrative Agency Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51 (Supp. 1964). The
liquor control board, although subject to the Administrative Agency Law for most
purposes, has its own scope-of-review provision. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-464
(1952).
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 190 (Supp. 1964).
4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-201 (1952).
(1043)
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significance in assessing the allocation of responsibility between the board
and the courts is the board's competence and expertise. Although these
highly subjective qualities defy evaluation in the absence of extensive
working contact, the available extrinsic evidence suggests a strong legislative concern for securing a capable board. The salaries of the board's
chairman (18,000 dollars) and its members (17,000 dollars) exceed those
of virtually every other Pennsylvania commission or administrative agency, 5
except the public utility commission.6 The PLCB's duties include adminis7
tration of the state liquor stores and policing of outstanding licenses,
whereas other Pennsylvania licensing boards engage exclusively in licensing
activities at infrequent intervals and their members receive only small per
diem allowances as compensation.8 Most other states do not compensate
their liquor law administrators as liberally as does Pennsylvania.9
Significant comparisons can also be made with regard to the board's
staff. Most Pennsylvania licensing authorities are severely understaffed
and their employees frequently have only questionable qualifications.10
The board's enforcement functions are performed by approximately 150
officers, the second greatest number of any state." Although these employees do not participate directly in the issuance of licenses their services
probably permit the board to devote more time to this function. More
pertinent to the licensing process are the board's hearing examiners. In
1962 there were nine such examiners,' 2 each of whom was appointed by the
Governor and must be "learned in the law." 13 Either the board on its
own motion or the applicant may initiate a hearing before either the board
or an examiner, 14 with the ultimate grant or denial emanating from the
board.' 5 Hearings are safeguarded by the adjudicatory procedure of the
Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law.' 6
Finally, the legislature has attempted to avoid the conflict of interest
problems that have haunted other Pennsylvania licensing boards, whose
5 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 773.2 (1962).
6PA. STAT. ANN. tit 66, §452(c) (1959) ($20,000 for chairman; $19,000 for

other members).
7 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (Supp. 1964).
8 See Dean, The Opportunity To Be Heard in the Professional Licensing Process
in Pennsylvania, 67 DIcK. L. REV. 31, 35 (1962).
) See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11560 (Supp. 1964) ($14,000 to each member).
See also JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE STATES To STUDY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS,
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL 14, 79 (1960) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE
STUDY].
10 See Dean,

11 JOINT

supra note 8, at 36.
114 (1959 statistics).

However, the staff had been
halved during the period from 1949 to 1959. Id. at 47.
12 95 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 1961-1962, at 387 (Richey ed. 1962).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-402 (1952).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-464 (1952).
COMMITTEE STUDY

15 Ibid.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.31-.36
License Case, 200 Pa. Super. 439, 446, 188
Schoenfeld, Administrative Discretion of the
the Issuance of Licenses, 28 TEPIP. L.Q. 161,

(1962). See Club Oasis, Inc., Liquor
A.2d 792, 796 (1963). See generally
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board in
181 (1954).
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members are selected from the regulated group.1 7 PLCB members or
employees may not maintain any interest in an enterprise dealing in
8
alcoholic beverages.'
B. The Ground Rules of Liquor Licensing
The legislature has attempted to control the abuses in consumption
of alcohol' 9 by outlawing trade in liquor except as licensed by the state.2 0
The board's power to issue licenses for the retail sale of liquor 21 extends to
hotels, restaurants, and clubs,2 2 and is the exclusive source of authority for
private retail sales.9 The Liquor Code imposes a quota of one retail
liquor license for each fifteen hundred inhabitants of a municipality.2 4
Clubs, hotels, and airport restaurants are not counted in determining
whether a quota will be exceeded,2 5 although once the quota is filled no new
licenses may issue except to hotels or airport restaurants? 6 The board's
only other opportunity to exceed the quota limitations lies in its "power
to increase the number of licenses in any . . . municipality which in the
opinion of the board is located within a resort area."2 7 However, many
more licenses are actually outstanding than would appear to be authorized
by the quota laws. 8 This is due to the continuation of licenses previously
granted under less stringent quota limitations? 9
If the statutory requirements are met, hotel and restaurant liquor
licenses must issue, but a club license may be issued or refused in the
board's discretion?0 The board also may reject an otherwise proper
application if the proposed location is within 300 feet of certain public and
charitable institutions,3 or if the license would be detrimental to the well2
being of the neighborhood within 500 feet.
17 See Dean, supra note 8, at 36-37.
Is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-210 (1952).
39 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-104(a), (c)
(1952).
20
E.g., Bierman Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 200, 145 A.2d 876 (1958);
Tahiti Bar, Inc., Liquor License Case, 186 Pa. Super. 214, 216, 142 A.2d 491, 492
(1958), af'd, 395 Pa. 355, 150 A.2d 112, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 85 (1959).
21 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 2-207(d) (1952).
2 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-401 (1952).
23 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-491(1)
(1952).
24
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (a) (Supp. 1964). Before 1960 the quota was
one license for each 1000 inhabitants. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (1952). See

generally
CHILDs, LIQUOR UNDER CONTROL 83-84 (1960).
25
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (Supp. 1964).
2

6Ibid.

27

§ 4-461(b) (1952).
In 1958 there was approximately one liquor license for each 533 people although
the statutory quota at the time was one license for each 1000 people. JOINT COMMITTEE
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,

28

STUDY 99.

29 See, e.g., Carver Community Center Liquor License Case, 200 Pa. Super. 517,
189 A.2d
914 (1963).
30
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964); cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47,
§4-432(a) (1952) for an identical distinction in the issuance of malt and brewed
beverages retail licenses.
3 1
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964).
32 Ibid.
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An aggrieved party may appeal as of right to the quarter sessions
court of the county in which the premises are locatedas which court "shall
hear the application de novo on questions of fact, administrative discretion
and such other matters as are involved . . . . 34 A further appeal lies
as of right to the superior court 5 An appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will follow only if "specially allowed by the Superior Court itself or
by any one justice of the Supreme Court" 3 -the device of "allocatur."
However, this discretionary review power has not been used to fullest
advantage: since the present Liquor Code was enacted in 1951, allocatur
has been granted in only four cases involving the issuance of liquor
licenses.37 The lack of contact by the supreme court belies the significant
problems that the inferior courts have encountered in delineating judicial
and administrative spheres of authority.
II.

EVOLUTION OF A STANDARD FOR SCOPE OF REVIEW

A. Early Standard of Review

Before 1949 appeals from PLCB licensing determinations to the
county quarter sessions courts were governed as to scope of review by the
following provision: "The court shall hear the application de novo
.

. )y3S

Moreover, the statute expressly precluded further appeal. 39

In

Pennsylvania this limitation leaves open only "narrow certiorari," a device
restricting appellate review to questions of jurisdiction and procedural
regularity.4 0 The general dissatisfaction with this scheme 41 seems to have
been warranted. Substantive determinations of law or fact by the lower
tribunals were beyond the purview of the appellate courts. Despite the
existence of a statewide agency administering a supposedly uniform liquor
licensing policy, the quarter sessions courts of each county were independent
and final authorities on the interpretation of the Liquor Code and on the
policies which controlled licensing.42 Although some of these courts gave
33 PA. STAT. ANN. tit

to the county court. Ibid.
34

47, § 4-464 (1952).

In Allegheny County the appeal is

Ibid.

35 Ibid.
3

tit. 17, § 190 (Supp. 1964).
See Appeal of Speranza, 416 Pa. 348, 206 A.2d 292 (1965); Willowbrook
Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962) ; Obradovich
Liquor License Case, 386 Pa. 342, 126 A.2d 435 (1956) ; Sawdey Liquor License Case,
369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951).
38 Pa. Laws 1937, act 370, § 404, at 1781.
39 Pa. Laws 1933, act 91, § 7, at 254.
40 See Raby v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 405 Pa. 495, 176 A.2d 661 (1962);
Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 517-19, 55 A.2d 534, 535-36 (1947);
Blair Liquor License Case, 158 Pa. Super. 365, 45 A.2d 421 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Hilderbrand, 139 Pa. Super. 304, 11 A.2d 688 (1940) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. Rav. 733
(1950).
41 See, e.g., CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL WORK 178-82 (1947); Byse, Opportunity
To Be Heard in License Ismanwe, 101 U. PA. L. Ray. 57, 85-86 (1952).
42 See McGettigan's Liquor License Case, 131 Pa. Super. 280, 286, 200 Atl. 213,
215 (1938).
6 PA. STAT. ANN.

37
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controlling weight to board decisions by reversing only if the board abused
its discretion, others heard license applications completely anew, and totally
disregarded the board's proceedings4 3 Predictably, the lower courts' in44
terpretations of the Liquor Code frequently were in conflict.
Against this background, the superior court's desire to tighten the
reins on lower court review of board decisions was understandable. In
the leading case of Azarewics Liquor License Case, 5 the board under its
statutory grant of discretion, had refused to license premises that were
within three hundred feet of a church. 46 On appeal the quarter sessions
court overruled the board and ordered issuance of the license without
finding specific or different facts. The superior court held that despite
legislative authorization to the quarter sessions courts to hear the case de
novo, they should not substitute their discretion for that of the PLCB on
issues over which discretion is specifically granted the board. Since the
superior court construed this discretionary authority to be exclusive, the
court of quarter sessions would be permitted to reverse the board in these
areas only upon a finding of new facts.
Because appellate court review before 1949 was confined to those
issues cognizable on "narrow certiorari"--jurisdiction and the regularity
of proceedings 4 7-the superior court was left virtually powerless to
correct even blatant errors of fact or law unless they could be squeezed
into the "narrow certiorari" mold. The Azarewicz majority, by framing
the question in terms of the lower court's substitution of its discretion for
that of the board, found an "irregularity in the proceedings." The superior
court's reversal was probably impelled by the lower court's unreasoned
reversal of a board decision that on its face was effectuating the statutory
policy of restricting liquor licenses in the vicinity of churches. However,
this decision is indicative of the general strain imposed by the courts
on the "narrow certiorari" doctrine, as the Pennsylvania appellate courts
struggled to assert control over the merits of controversies seemingly
withheld from them by the legislature.48
Narrowly read, Azarewica was confined to the modest holding that
only substitution of discretion was reviewable. Thus, a lower court finding,
on additional facts, that the board abused its discretion would in theory
be a judgment on the merits immune from superior court consideration on
"narrow certiorari" review,49 even in the face of a patently unreasonable
decision below. Even more lamentably, if a quarter sessions court had
reversed an apparently erroneous board decision without finding new
43

See Byse, supra note 41, at 86.

44 Ibid.
45 163 Pa. Super. 459, 62 A.2d 78 (1948) (allocatur denied).
46See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964).
47 See authorities cited note 40 supra.

See Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 736 (1950).
49425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 116 A.2d 79 (1955)
(allocatur denied).
48
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facts, the Azarewicz holding would require the superior court to nullify the
quarter sessions' decision without examining the merits because of the
"irregularity in the proceedings." Perhaps sensing the irrational ramifications of the majority's rule, a dissenter in Azarewica reluctantly concluded
that the quarter sessions court's exercise of discretion, even if only substitutionary, was an error of law and thus not reviewable on narrow
certiorari. 5 0 Although the case clearly presented important issues for
the administration of liquor licensing and even broader issues regarding
the scope of narrow certiorari review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
nevertheless denied allocatur.
Since the opinion in Azarewicz was controlled by the superior court's
necessity of working within the narrow certiorari restrictions upon their
own appellate jurisdiction, it could not reflect the court's judgment on the
proper scope of review of the board. The case thus shed little light on
whether the superior court, on full review, would have allowed a quarter
sessions court to exercise its own judgment on facts fully developed before
it in a hearing de novo, 51 or whether it would have confined quarter sessions'
reversals to only those cases in which the board abused its discretion. The
Azarewicz court did not have the power to promulgate either standard,
and its decision seems inapposite to subsequent scope of review problems
unencumbered by narrow certiorari limitations.
B. Legislative Intervention
The legislature, apparently sensitive to the developing problems, significantly amended the relevant statutes in the 1949 session, the first after
the Azarewicz decision. 52 The narrow certiorari doctrine, which had
thwarted unification of the law through normal superior court review, was
neutralized by specifically authorizing any party to the proceeding to
appeal to the superior court. However, the legislature's alteration of the
provision defining the quarter sessions' scope of review of the board was
extremely ambiguous. Possibly wary of even Azarewicz's small incursion
into the quarter sessions' freedom of decision,5 the legislature merely
amplified the previous language, which had authorized a hearing de novo,
by inserting the following italicized words:
The court shall hear the application de novo on questions of
fact, administrative discretion and such other matters as are
involved . . . . The court shall either sustain or over-rule the
action of the board and either order or deny the issuance of a new
license or the renewal or transfer of the license to the applicant.5
50 163 Pa. Super. at 464-65, 62 A.2d at 81.

51 Cf. Colligan Liquor License Case, 3 Bucks 34 (Ct Quarter Sess. Bucks County,
Pa., 1949).
52The amendment brought the statute to its present form in PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, §4-464 (1952).
53 See 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 245-46, 116 A.2d
79, 84 (1955) (dissenting opinion) (allocatur denied).
64
PA. STAT. ANN. fit 47, § 4-464 (1952).

PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR LICENSING

The alternatives in construction are numerous. Does the de novo hearing
"con questions of . . . administrative discretion" mean that the quarter
sessions courts may freely substitute their discretion for the board's,
thereby overturning Azarewicz's ruling that statutory grants of "discretion" to the liquor board were "exclusive"? Or is the board's exercise
of discretion, if not abused, still final on questions that the Liquor Code
expressly directs to the board's discretion, on the theory that such a
legislative grant overrides the general scope of review provision? Does
the amendment authorize the court to hear the question of administrative
discretion de novo, but to decide on this record only the issue of whether
the board abused its discretion? 56
C. Avoidance of the Amendment
Regardiess of the ultimate resolution of these issues of construction,
the obvious starting point is an assessment of the impact of these crucial
amendments in their setting as responses to the A4arewicz case.5" Nevertheless the appellate court development of a standard of review in liquor
licensing cases was accomplished with misplaced reliance on Azarewicz
and without discussion of the 1949 amendment. Although the quarter
sessions courts were for the most part guilty of the same oversight,58 in the
DiRocco License Case,59 decided shortly after the 1949 amendment, a
quarter sessions court expressly exercised its independent judgment on
whether the license should issue for premises within 300 feet of a school.60
"Without reference to any action the board may have taken," 61 the court
reversed the board and issued the license. The superior court reversed
on a collateral point without discussing the 1949 amendment or examining
the lower court's assumption of authority to exercise unfettered "administrative discretion" in a de novo hearing.6 2
55
Byse, supra note 41, at 82; see, e.g., Duncan v. Mack, 59 Ariz. 36, 42, 122
P.2d 215, 218 (1942) ; Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 615, 646, 152 A.2d 731, 742-43, 757
(1959) (dissenting opinions).
656 This interpretation was ultimately accepted. See, e.g., Clinton Management,
Inc., Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 8, 12, 145 A.2d 873, 874-75 (1958) ; cf.
De Mond v. Liquor Control Comm'fn, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943).
57Cf. Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANit. tit. 46, §552(4) (1952).
Compare Cohen Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 8, 12, 184 A.2d 387, 389 (1962)
(allocatur denied) (inferring legislative approval of judicial rule from failing to
alter it).
58 See Greene-Dreher Legion Home License, 69 Pa. D. & C. 425, 429-30 (Ct.
Quarter Sess. Pike County 1949). But cf. Reigelsville Legion Home Liquor License,
86 Pa. D. & C. 309, 316 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Bucks County 1953).
59 69 Pa. D. & C. 370 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Chester County 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 167 Pa. Super. 381, 74 A.2d 501 (1950).
60
Accord, In re Alessi, 39 Delaware 310 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Delaware County,
Pa., 1952); in re Appeal of Subers, 40 Delaware 22 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Delaware
County, Pa., 1952) (dictum).
61 DiRocco License, 69 Pa. D. & C. 370, 371 (Ct Quarter Sess. Chester County
1949).
62 167 Pa. Super. 381, 74 A.2d 501 (1950).
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The next license issuance case to reach the superior court after the
1949 amendment was the Hotchkiss Liquor License Case.63 The board
had refused a license because the applicant's premises were within 300 feet
of a church. However, only four months later the board issued a license
to the same applicant on substantially the same evidence. The superior
court, affirming the lower court's denial of the license, held that the lower
court had not merely substituted its discretion for the board's, but had
found affirmatively that the board abused its discretion. Although the
board merited reversal under either standard, the superior court, without
expressly considering the alternative standards of review, seemed to give
the quarter sessions courts a role far short of that conferred by a total de
novo review of the board. In a misleading dictum which was to have
considerable impact on future law, the court said:
Neither in the Azarewics case nor in any other case have we
failed to recognize the fundamental principle that administrative
discretion is always subject to judicial review. The distinction
between judicial review of administrative discretion and the substituting of judicial discretion for administrative discretion is by
now well recognized .

.

..

The intimation that Asarewicz expressed a judgment that "abuse of discretion" is the proper standard of review for the quarter sessions courts
was incorrect. It failed to recognize that Azarewicz was merely designating "substitution of discretion" as a procedural irregularity reviewable on
narrow certiorari. Azarewicz did not purport to erect a standard of
review for all cases in which the quarter sessions court conducts a full
hearing. Not only did the Hotchkiss dictum fail to recognize the limited
relevance of Azarewicz, it nowhere noticed or discussed the 1949 amendment's addition of "questions of administrative discretion" as matters considered de novo by the quarter sessions court.
Moreover, the court in Hotchkiss illustrated its "abuse-substitution"
distinction erroneously drawn from Azarezicz with two lower court cases
of questionable relevance. The first, Niedzinsky Post 624 Am. Legion
License Case, 5 was decided before the 1949 amendment and in dictum
quoted language from Azarewics itself out of context. In any event it is
far from clear on the facts of Niedzinsky that the quarter sessions court
really did limit itself to measuring the board's action by an abuse of discretion standard.6 6 The second lower court case mentioned in Hotchkiss
Pa. Super. 506, 83 A2d 398 (1951).
64 Id. at 511, 83 A.2d at 400.
6566 Pa. D. & C. 618 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Lackawanna County 1949).
66
The board denied the license upon finding that the quota of nine licenses for
the area was exceeded by thirty-two licenses, and that the premises were within
300 feet of a church. The quarter sessions court reversed, relying mainly on the
presence of other licensed premises within 300 feet of the church, the absence of a
complaint by the church (which is not required by statute for a denial of a license),
and the general commercial character of the neighborhood.
63169
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was Sylvan Seal Milk, Inc. v. PennsylvaniaMilk Control Comm'n.67 The
language in that opinion, quoted by Hotchkiss in defining the scope of
review of liquor licensing determinations, referred to the review of milk
control commission orders. The Sylvan Seal opinion expressly described
the appeal to the courts under the applicable statute 68 as "not a de novo
proceeding," 6 thereby clearly distinguishing it from appeals under the
Liquor Code.
The poorly supported and insufficiently analyzed Hotchkiss dictum
obscured the importance of the statutory changes, and subsequent cases
perpetuated this oversight. In 1953 the superior court in William E.
Burrell I.B.P.O.E. of W. Liquor License Case 7o cited for the first time the
scope-of-review provision. However, the court simply assumed an "abuse
of discretion" standard, citing Hotchkiss, 71 without quoting or discussing
the seemingly broader statutory standard for quarter sessions review.
Since in Burrell the board was reversed for an abuse of discretion, differentiating between the alternative standards of review was again not crucial
to the result. But in two cases soon to follow, Zernani Liquor License
Case 72 and Zeltner Liquor License Case,73 the court's failure to confront
the issue of the proper scope of quarter sessions review may have affected
the result. In both cases two or more qualified applicants were seeking
the only license available under the applicable quota. In both cases the
quarter sessions court, without finding materially different facts, ordered
a license to be issued to an applicant not selected by the board, which would
have been permissible only if the 1949 amendment had contemplated the
unrestricted exercise of "administrative discretion" by the quarter sessions
courts. However, the superior court, again ignoring the amendment,
reversed the quarter sessions courts stating that they were to take evidence
only to determine whether the board abused its discretion. 74 Moreover,
the Zernmni opinion, in following the "abuse of discretion" standard,
applied it to a factual situation not contemplated by Azarewicz. The court
in the latter case had precluded the quarter sessions courts from substituting
their discretion for the board's only where the Liquor Code expressly
directed the board to exercise its own discretion on the issues in question.7 5
In Zermani, however, the "abuse of discretion" standard was extended to
an application for a restaurant liquor license, which the board had no
statutory discretion to deny. 76
67
6

74 Pa. D. & C. 289 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1951).

s PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-906 (1958).

19 74 Pa. D. & C. at 297.
70172
Pa. Super. 346, 94 A.2d 110 (1953).
71
Accord, Rizzo Liquor License Case, 174 Pa. Super. 457, 460, 101 A.2d 180,
181 (1953).
72 173 Pa. Super. 428, 98 A2d 645 (1953).
73 174 Pa. Super. 98, 100 A.2d 132 (1953).
74 See

(1953).
75

Zermani Liquor License Case, 173 Pa. Super. 428, 431, 98 A.2d 645, 647

Azarewicz Liquor License Case, 163 Pa. Super. 459, 62 A.2d 78 (1948); see
text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
76 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964).
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The issue of the appropriate quarter sessions scope of review was
clearly argued to the superior court for the first time in Booker Hotel Corp.
Liquor License Case,77 where the appellant urged that the lower court
"erred in not exercising its own independent discretion following the
hearing de novo." 78 But the superior court reaffirmed the "abuse of discretion" standard, 79 supporting this conclusion only by citation of its own
recent cases with no mention of the 1949 amendment. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied allocatur. A glint of the superior court's awareness of the statutory amendment is suggested by its citation form. Although the most recent cases supporting its position were cited directly, the
Azarevucz case, decided before the amendment, was introduced as collateral authority.80 This change in citation signals may have been intended
to reveal the court's conclusion that the 1949 amendment did not empower
the quarter sessions courts to exercise "administrative discretion," but it
certainly was not calculated to attract much attention.
The superior court also missed another opportunity in Booker Hotel
to rationalize its holding. The license applicant, contending that the
quarter sessions court should freely exercise its independent discretion,
analogized to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code under which the lower
court is given complete discretion to rule de novo in license suspension
cases, regardless of the evidence taken before the secretary of revenue.8 '
The relevant statutory language charges the lower court "to take testimony
and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is subject to suspension of operator's license ....

" 82

Although

the differences between this statute and the de novo review provision of
the Liquor Code are not self-evident, the court reached a contrary result
without express analysis. It merely said of the Motor Vehicle Code case
cited by appellant that "the decision is plainly inapplicable." 8 Perhaps
the court was swayed by the difference in statutory language between a
lower court "determining" the issue anew under the Motor Vehicle Code
and its "hearing" of the issue de novo under the Liquor Code. Possibly
the court felt that in motor vehicle license suspension cases the lower
courts should have complete freedom of decision to compensate for the
175 Pa. Super. 89, 103 A.2d 486 (1954)
8 Id.at 91, 103 A.2d at 487.

77
7

(allocatur denied).

79
Accord, Bierman Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 200, 145 A.2d 876
(1958) ; Haase Liquor License Case, 184 Pa. Super. 356, 134 A.2d 682 (1957) ; De
Angelis Liquor License Case, 183 Pa. Super. 388, 133 A.2d 266 (1957); Rzasa's
Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 30, 115 A.2d 797 (1955) ; Her-Bell, Inc., Liquor
License Case, 176 Pa. Super. 206, 107 A.2d 572 (1954).
80 175 Pa. Super. at 93, 103 A.2d at 488.
81 Ibid. See also Appeal of First Presbyterian Church, 39 Washington 150 (Ct.
Quarter
Sess. Washington County, Pa., 1959).
8
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 620 (Supp. 1964). The language is still interpreted
to give the lower court complete discretion de novo. Rabin Motor Vehicle Operator
License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 555, 176 A.2d 460 (1961). See also Commonwealth
v. Wagner, 364 Pa. 566, 568, 73 A.2d 676, 677 (1950).
83 175 Pa. Super. at 93, 103 A.2d at 488.
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informality of administrative hearing procedures. The usefulness of the
Booker Hotel opinion would have been greatly enhanced if the court had
explained its basis for distinction.
D. Division in the Superior Court Over Proper Scope of Review
Not until 1955, in the 425-429, Inc. Liquor License Case,8 4 was the
1949 amendment's significance openly discussed in an appellate court
opinion. Although the majority reversed the quarter sessions court for
substituting its discretion for that of the board, Judge Ervin's dissent
traced the origin of the majority's principle to Azarewicz and concluded
that in the 1949 amendment "the legislature intended the [quarter sessions]
court on appeal to have administrative discretion to determine whether
or not the application should be granted." 8 5 Judge Ervin appropriately
would have limited the superior court's function to effectuating the legislative intent, without regard to personal views on the merits of the competing policy arguments. Despite this overt split in the superior court and
the clear exposition of the grounds of difference in Judge Ervin's dissent,8 6
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied allocatur.
Judge Ervin's views on the proper scope of quarter sessions review
reappeared three years later in Judge Gunther's dissent in Kreiser Liquor
License Case. 7 The majority held that the quarter sessions court, in
reversing the board's determination that the area in question was not a
"resort," 8 8 had overstepped the bounds of an "abuse of discretion" review.
Judge Gunther, however, would have upheld the lower court. Apparently
rejecting the "abuse of discretion" standard, he stated the question on
appeal to be "whether there is sufficient evidence in the [quartersessions]
record to show that Franklin Township . . . is located in a resort
area . . . . "8
In Cialella Liquor License Case,90 the court again
applied an "abuse of discretion" standard, but a concurring opinion implored the supreme court to examine on allocatur the impact of the 1949
amendment on the scope of quarter sessions review, although the plea went
unheeded.
E. The Superior Court's Shift in the Standard of Review
and Action by the Supreme Court
In the year following Cialella, the standard of review expressed by
Judge Gunther dissenting in Kreiser became without explanation the
84 179 Pa. Super. 235, 116 A.2d 79 (1955)

(allocatur denied).
85 Id. at 245, 116 A.2d at 84.
86judge Ervin's concurrence without opinion in Her-Bell, Inc., Liquor License
Case, 176 Pa. Super. 206, 107 A.2d 572 (1954), was subsequently explained to be on
the ground that he differed with the majority's formulation of the scope-of-review
standard.

See 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 239, 245, 116 A.2d

79, 84 (1955)

(dissenting opinion).

87 188 Pa. Super. 206, 209, 145 A.2d 880, 881 (1958).
88 See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-461(b) (1952) ; notes 176-180

and accompanying text.
(Emphasis added.)
89 188 Pa. Super. at 210, 145 A.2d at 881.
90 191 Pa. Super. 526, 531, 159 A.2d 64, 67 (1960) (allocatur denied).

infra
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majority's standard in William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License
Case."' The quarter sessions court had reversed the board, which had
denied a resort club license on the apparently plausible ground of lack of
need. 2 The superior court agreed with the trial court "that the applicant
has produced sufficient testimony to show there is a necessity for the facilities . . . "1 93 and affirmed, without alluding to an abuse of discretion
by the board. When the superior court accorded identical treatment to
the board's denial of a resort club license in Willowbrook Country Club,
Inc. Liquor License Case,'4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally
granted allocatur.
The choice to review Willowbrook on allocatur was a good one. Not
only did the case present troublesome problems of statutory interpretation,95 but it also re-emphasized the need for a definitive exploration of the
appropriate scope-of-review standard for the quarter sessions courts.
Unfortunately, the supreme court did not address itself directly to the
scope-of-review issues, but treated them almost in passing:
We thoroughly agree with the conclusion of [the superior court]
. that the proof in the record clearly sustains the conclusion,
that the proposed licensed premises are in a "resort area" as
contemplated by the legislature . . . and that the Board abused
its discretion in concluding otherwise 9 6
In fact the superior court had never accused the board of an abuse of
discretion, and, on the issues actually raised by the case, the board was
probably not responsible for more than an error of judgment.9 7 Nonetheless, in one sentence the supreme court mingled both standards of review
without suggesting a distinction. The court then resolved the second
substantive issue in the case, the "need" for the license, by noting merely
that "the testimony cleary manifests a substantial need . .
,, 98 The
phrase again muddles the distinction between the quarter sessions courts
exercising independent judgment on the testimony developed before them
and their determining whether the board abused its statutory discretion.
Mr. Justice Cohen dissented, noting that "the Liquor Code' provided for a
system of complete regulation and assigned to the courts only appellate
review." 99 Although he, too, ignored the statutory language governing
scope of review, his position that a major objective of the present Liquor
Code was to remove the courts' licensing functions suggests his awareness
91196 Pa. Super. 519, 175 A.2d 908 (1961).
92
See note 179 infra and accompanying text.
93 196 Pa. Super. at 523, 175 A.2d at 910 (Emphasis added.) ; accord, Mannitto
Haven Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 524, 175 A.2d 911 (1961).
94 198 Pa. Super. 242, 181 A.2d 698, aff'd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962).
95 See notes 199-209 infra and accompanying text.
96 409 Pa. at 373, 187 A.2d at 155. (Emphasis added.)
97 See notes 199-209 infra and accompanying text.
98 409 Pa. at 375, 187 A.2d at 146. (Emphasis added.)
99 Ibid.
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of the standard of review issues and his inclination toward an abuse of
discretion standard.
In light of the small number of cases that the supreme court hears on
allocatur, strategic selection and thoughtful disposition are essential. If
anything, the court's allocatur opinions should reflect even more exhaustive
analysis and more precise articulation than opinions in its mandatory
jurisdiction cases, which necessarily include many relatively routine
matters. ° ° The superficial treatment of the scope-of-review issues in
Willowbrook does not seem satisfactorily to discharge the court's obligation to use its discretionary jurisdiction to settle the law in areas normally
not before it.
F. Post-Willowbrook Standards of Review
Two cases decided shortly after Willowbrook demonstrated that the
confusion concerning proper scope of quarter sessions review was not
dispelled by the supreme court. One strongly suggests that the quarter
sessions court's discretion could supplant that of the board in determining
whether the applicant's premises were in a "resort" area,101 while the other,
not a resort-area case, proclaimed that "abuse of discretion" is the standard for reviewing board determinations that the license would be detrimental to the neighborhood. 0 2 Several months later in Club Oasis Liquor
License Case,l -0 also not a resort-area case, the superior court, describing
the 1949 amendment for the first time in a majority opinion, emphatically
stated that "abuse of discretion" is the only question properly before the
quarter sessions courts. In support of this statement, the court cited ten
cases, including Azarewicz, 1 4 although curiously neglecting to cite the
Willowbrook case, the only Pennsylvania Supreme Court pronouncement
in the area in recent years. Moreover, none of the cases cited were from
the line of resort-club cases, culminating in Willowbrook, that had drifted
toward the unrestricted exercise of discretion by the quarter sessions courts.
The specter of dual lines of authority interpreting the same statutory
provision was soon vanquished, however, in Andes Grove Rod & Gun Club
Liquor License Case.10 5 The court deliberately reinstated the original rule
that the quarter sessions court, even in resort-club cases, could reverse
the liquor board only when the court's specific findings demonstrated that

100 For

example, the supreme court's mandatory jurisdiction includes all civil
suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Compare PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §41 (1962), zith PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 181, 184 (Supp. 1964).
01 Wildwood Golf Club Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 353, 359, 185 A.2d
649, 653 (1962) (allocatur denied).
' 0 2 Gismondi Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 619, 186 A.2d 448 (1962);
see Koppenhaver Liquor License Case, 200 Pa. Super. 214, 188 A.2d 847 (1963).
103 Id. at 439, 188 A.2d 792.
04
' Id. at 445 n.3, 188 A.2d at 795 n.3.
105 201 Pa. Super. 21, 190 A.2d 355 (1963).
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the board abused its discretion. Subsequent cases in the several areas of
board discretion have for the most part adhered to this doctrine. 10
G. Possible Explanations of and Alternatives to the Courts'
Treatment of the Scope-of-Review Standard
For better or for worse, "abuse of discretion" has become the established standard for judicial review of liquor license determinations, even
though this interpretation of the statute does not seem to have been
deliberately chosen by the judiciary. Rather, it seems more likely that
the appellate courts were precluded tactically from reversing themselves
after repeatedly overlooking a statutory amendment that seemed to expand
the discretion exercisable by the quarter sessions courts.
The courts' questionable use of authorities in reaching this result could
have been buttressed by resort to the admittedly strong policies standing
in opposition to complete de novo review of PLCB licensing determinations.
Bestowing such broad discretion upon the lower courts would eliminate
any benefits accruing from the fact that the board's full-time administration
of the liquor business in Pennsylvania has equipped it with the expertise
to evaluate applicants and to decide on the proper distribution of liquor
licenses.' 0 7 But even apart from the quality of adjudication, it is desirable
from the standpoints of evenhandedness and coordination to have a unitary
source of policy for licensing decisions.' 08 Immersing the local judiciary
in the licensing process, with its political overtones, subjects it to unnecessary pressure and controversy. 10 9 An indication of the courts' inclination
to reward license applicants appears in the often cited statistic that as of
106 See Koehler's Bar, Inc., Liquor License Case, 204 Pa. Super. 25, 201 A.2d
306 (1964); Jack's Delicatessen, Inc., Liquor License Case, 202 Pa. Super. 481, 198
A.2d 604 (1964); Seventeenth Ward United Veterans Ass'n Liquor License Case,
202 Pa. Super. 196, 195 A.2d 893 (1963) ; Teti Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super.
87, 191 A.2d 683 (1963); Solomon Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 82, 191
A.2d 681 (1963); Riviera Country Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 70,
191 A.2d 725 (1963). But see Aqua Club Liquor License Case, 202 Pa. Super. 192,
195 A.2d 802 (1963).
107 Significantly, the courts have deferred unquestioningly to the rulings of
agencies of apparently equal or less experience. See, e.g., Pennsylvania State Athletic Comm'n v. Bratton, 177 Pa. Super. 598, 112 A.2d 422 (1955) (allocatur denied) ;
Hogan v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 558-59 n.2,
83 A.2d 386, 389 n.2 (1951).
108 See Byse, Opportunity To Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
57, 82 (1952); Schoenfeld, Administrative Discretion of the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board in the Issuance of Licenses, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 161, 183 (1954).
109 See CHLDs, MAKING REPEAL WoRK 109 (1947); JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY
24-25. Compare Azarewicz Liquor License Case, 163 Pa. Super. 459, 463, 62 A.2d
78, 80-81 (1948) (dictum) (allocatur denied).
The Courts of Quarter Sessions of the various counties, of course are
more sensitive to the desires and complaints of their constituents than they
are to the general picture of the law over the entire state. For this reason,
it is not only desirable but almost essential that there should be appeal from
the findings of a local court to a state court if the local court has a right to
set aside the findings of the Liquor Control Board.
Letter From Robert H. Jordan, Esquire, Former Attorney for the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, March 1964.

PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR LICENSING

1948, one-third of the parties who were denied licenses appealed, and that
two-thirds of these appellants were successful." 0 Finally, there is the
obvious duplication of effort demanded by full hearings before both the
board and the quarter sessions courts.
Nevertheless, some authorities favor free exercise of discretion by
the quarter sessions courts without regard to the board's previous disposal
of the license application. At least one superior court judge I prefers this
complete review because of the quarter sessions courts' intimate knowledge
of local conditions. Furthermore, to the extent that field examiners gather
the facts necessary for board decisions," 2 the board's findings of fact are
arguably less reliable than those of experienced judges." 3 The arguments
against lower court discretion on appeal are therefore not so compelling
that the appellate courts could justifiably hold without discussion that the
1949 amendment could not possibly have intended to overthrow the "abuse
of discretion" standard.
The appellate courts, through either carelessness or attempted judicial
statesmanship, might also have shown a reluctance to establish review
standards for the liquor board that deviated from those of the state's
Administrative Agency Law, 114 which governs the bulk of state-wide
agencies."15 That statute directs the reviewing court to affirm the agency
decision unless it violates the appellant's constitutional rights, "is not in
accordance with law," or "is not supported by substantial evidence." "3
This composite standard seems closely akin to "abuse of discretion."
Although the liquor control board is governed by the Liquor Code's review
provisions rather than by those of the Administrative Agency Law,"x7
cases decided under one statute have been cited in connection with the
other . 8s A tendency to assimilate the two may partially explain the failure
9
to come to grips with the statutory de novo review language."
11o

See Byse, supra note 108, at 86.

1l See 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 246, 116 A.2d 79,

85 (1955)

(Ervin, J., dissenting) (allocatur denied).
4-402, 4-464 (1952).

112 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§

113 Cf. Byse, supra note 108, at 84.
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (1962),

as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 71, §§ 1710.21, .51 (Supp. 1964).

115 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51 (Supp. 1964).

"6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962); see Pennsylvania State Bd. of
Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Schireson, 360 Pa. 129, 61 A.2d 343 (1948). See
generally Hanna, "Substantial Evidence" Under the Pennsylvania Administrative
Agency Law, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 264 (1949).

17 Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962),

with PA. STAT. ANN.

tit 47, § 4-464 (1952).
118 See, e.g., Sable Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Super. 177, 182,
177 A.2d 115, 118 (1962) ; Pennsylvania State Athletic Comm'n v. Bratton, 177 Pa.
Super. 598, 606, 112 A.2d 422, 425 (1955) (allocatur denied) ; cf. Appeal of Hotchkiss, 169 Pa. Super. 506, 83 A.2d 398 (1951) (citing Milk Control Comm'n case).
119 See Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959), which was decided under
the de novo review provision of the Policeman's Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 23538 (1957). The majority seemed to favor an "abuse of discretion" interpretation, 396 Pa. at 613, 152 A.2d at 741, whereas Justices Musmanno, Bell, and
McBride, in two dissents, stated that the de novo provision vested absolute discretion in
the reviewing court, id. at 615, 646, 152 A.2d at 742, 757. See also Baker Case, 409 Pa.
143, 185 A.2d 521 (1962) ("abuse of discretion" standard).
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Another force which may have impelled the appellate courts to keep
absolute licensing discretion from the lower courts is a desire to avoid
judicial encroachment on the legislature 120 even though the exercise of
administrative discretion by an agency might be a permissible delegation

of a legislative function.12'

The appellate court opinions in liquor licensing

cases, however, have never referred to this potential restriction. Moreover,
from 1887 to prohibition the courts alone exercised licensing authority
bestowed under a very broad statutory standard directing them to hear
testimony for and against the application and to assess the public need for
the license and the fitness of the applicant.'
Although the Pennsylvania appellate courts have never drawn on
the experience of other states in developing a standard of review under a
statute providing for de novo appeal, such authority exists with supporting
rationales.
For example, the Texas courts have deliberately rejected
a literal reading of the statutory "de novo" language 12A and have adopted
a rule requiring affirmance of the board unless its decision is not supported
by "substantial evidence." 12 5 These opinions relied on considerations of
efficiency and the appropriate role of the courts in the administrative
process. 2 6 Another Texas decision narrowed the scope of a de novo
review to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.127
Connecticut 128 and New Mexico -9 courts have also balked on constitutional grounds at according trial courts absolute discretion in liquor
licensing cases. A contrary approach has been followed in Arizona, where
the legislative command that the court on appeal "hear and determine the
matter de novo" 130 has been applied literally.1 1
Although the timing of the Pennsylvania amendment expanding de
novo review to include "questions of fact, administrative discretion, and
120 PA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 1 vests the legislative power in the Pennsylvania General
Assembly. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 182-83, 92 A.2d 272,
287-88 (1952).
121 See Weinstein Liquor License Case, 159 Pa. Super. 437, 48 A.2d 1 (1946)
(allocatur denied); Marchines v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 1, 24 A.2d 691 (1942).
122 See e.g., Cambria County Liquor License Case, 78 Pa. Super. 28, 29 (1921);
Venango County Liquor License Case, 58 Pa. Super. 277 (1914). See generally
Tate Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 193, 199-200, 173 A.2d 657, 660 (1961).
123 See generally Byse, supra note 108, at 82-84.
124 TEXAS PENAL CODE art. 666-14 (1952).
125 See, e.g., Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 224 S.W.2d 198 (1949); Clark v.
Liquor Control Bd., 357 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Texas Liquor Control
Bd. v. Taylor, 338 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
126 See Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 367, 224 S.W.2d 198, 201 (1949).
127 Bradley v. Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
128 DeMond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943).
The de novo review language is no longer in the Connecticut statute. See CoNN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 60 (1960), Cichon v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 14 Conn. Supp. 155
(Super. Ct. 1946).
129 See Yarbrough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91, 214 P.2d 769 (1950).
130 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-210 (1956).
13' Lane v. Ferguson, 62 Ariz. 184, 156 P.2d 236 (1945) ; Duncan v. Mack, 59
Ariz. 36, 122 P.2d 215 (1942).
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such other matters as are involved" is a factor unique to the Pennsylvania
courts, discussions by other state courts of the factors underlying their
decision represent a more satisfactory judicial handling of the problem.
III. JUDICIAL EFFECTUATION OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY

If the quarter sessions courts are to reverse the board only for abuses
of discretion, they must confine their inquiries to possible misapplications
of law or "manifestly unreasonable" decisions on the evidence presented
to the court. 32 One means of assessing the impact of "abuse of discretion"
review upon the licensing process is to examine selected substantive issues
in detail. Because of the presumed influence of appellate court opinions
upon the lower tribunals and bar, particular attention will be given to the
clarity and fidelity with which these opinions implement the legislative
policy. To the extent that these policies are ignored, the courts cannot
detect abuses of discretion with sufficient accuracy.
A. The Distance Rules
1. The 300 Foot Rule
The Pennsylvania Liquor Code authorizes the board to refuse a license
to premises within 300 feet of certain restrictive institutions: "[T] he board
may, in its discretion, grant or refuse such new license or transfer if such
place proposed to be licensed is within three hundered feet of any church,
133
hospital, charitable institution, school or public playground .....
Similar provisions exist in many other states.' 3 4
Clear policies-such as protection of children and avoidance of indignities to church property ' 3 5-justify the board's discretionary power
to deny a license where otherwise one would automatically issue' 3 6
These policies should also cause a court in a close case to err on the side
of denying a license.13 7 Appellate decisions have been responsive to these
132E.g., Bierman Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 200, 206, 145 A.2d 876,
879 (1958); William E. Burrell I.B.P.O.E. of W. Liquor License Case, 172 Pa.
Super. 346, 350, 94 A.2d 110, 111 (1953) ; see Mielcuszny v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91, 176
At. 236 (1934). This case, though not a liquor licensing case, has often been cited
to determine abuses of discretion of the liquor control board.
'33 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964).
(Emphasis added.)
'34 In 1960 forty-one states limited liquor licenses near schools; thirty-eight
states limited them near churches; and nineteen limited them near hospitals, playgrounds, or other institutions. JOINT CoMMrrTE STUDY 37; see Annot, 59 A.L.R.2d
1439 (1958) (churches) ; Annot, 49 A.L.R.2d 1103 (1956) (schools).
135 See, e.g., Club Oasis, Inc., Liquor License Case, 200 Pa. Super. 439, 449,
188 A.2d 792, 797 (1963); Weiss Liquor License Case, 187 Pa. Super. 89, 142 A2d
385 (1958).
136 See generally, Schoenfeld, supra note 108, at 175-79. The grant of discretion
to the board in this area has been held constitutional. Clinton Management, Inc.,
Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 8, 145 A.Zd 873 (1958).
137 See, e.g., 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 241-42, 116
A.2d 79, 82 (1955) (allocatur denied) ; Rzasa's Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super.
30, 34, 115 A.2d 797 (1955).
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considerations. Thus the rule has been established that the mere presence
of a restrictive institution within 300 feet of the proposed liquor outlet
is sufficient reason for the board to refuse a license, regardless of the array
of other factors favoring the grant of the particular license.'38 The board
also has been allowed to deny a license despite the failure of the affected
institutions to protest, 39 and when the restrictive institution favors the
license.' 40 Also reflecting this stringent attitude, the 300-foot rule has
been stretched to deny a license to a restaurant that cut three feet from a
corner of its building to withdraw itself from the restricted area.' 4 .
In reviewing a license grant for abuse of discretion, the courts likewise
permit the board a fairly wide latitude of decision and are as responsive
to the appropriate considerations as they are in license denial cases. The
board has been sustained in granting licenses within 300 feet of restrictive
institutions upon finding factors such as a highly commercial neighborhood,
an applicant of good reputation and character, an established restaurant
to which the liquor business is only an auxiliary, the likelihood that patrons
will not degrade the neighborhood, and that generally neither the neighborhood nor the restrictive institution would be harmed. 1
However, the
courts have made an exception to their general deference to board decisions.

Although the Liquor Code requires a written opinion from the board only
when it refuses a license, 43 the reviewing courts, to promote the reasoned
exercise of discretion by the board, and to insure against unwanted licenses
in restricted areas, have creatively imposed on the board some responsibility
to record their reasons for issuing a license.

Accordingly, cases have held

that if the board granted a license without filing an opinion, the quarter
sessions court could then make its own findings and, if it arrived at a
contrary result, reverse the board for an "abuse of discretion." 144 Only
138 Cialella Liquor License Case, 191 Pa. Super. 526, 159 A.2d 64 (1960) (allocatur denied) ; 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, vipra note 137, at 240, 116 A.2d
at 82; cf. Solomon Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 82, 191 A.2d 681 (1963).
'39 See, e.g., Haase Liquor License Case, 175 Pa. Super. 618, 621, 106 A.2d 865,
866 (1954) ; Her-Bell, Inc., Liquor License Case, 176 Pa. Super. 206, 210-11, 107 A2d
572, 574 (1954) (dictum) ; cf. Club Oasis, Inc., Liquor License Case, 200 Pa. Super.
439, 443-44, 188 A.2d 792, 794 (1963) (restrictive institution need not appeal).
140425-429, Inc. Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 241, 116 A.2d 79, 82
(1955) (dictum) (allocatur denied).
'4' Haase Liquor License Case, 175 Pa. Super. 618, 106 A.2d 865 (1954)
(alternative holding) ; accord, Rizzo Liquor License Case, 174 Pa. Super. 143, 100 A.2d 135
(1953). But see Appeal of Sons of Italy, 10 Fayette 77 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Fayette
County, Pa., 1947).
142 See, e.g., Haase Liquor License Case, 184 Pa. Super. 356, 359-60, 134 A.2d
682, 683-84 (1957); Appeal of First Presbyterian Church, 39 Washington 150 (Ct.
Quarter Sess. Washington County, Pa., 1959) ; Zion Baptist Church v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd., 66 Montgomery 80 (Ct Quarter Sess. Montgomery County,
Pa., 1950) ; 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 240, 116 A.2d 79
(1955) (dictum) (allocatur denied). But cf. Club Oasis Liquor License Case, 200
Pa. Super. 439, 188 A.2d 792 (1963).
143 PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 47, § 4-464 (1952).
144 Cialella Liquor License Case, 191 Pa. Super. 526, 159 A.2d 64 (1960) (allocatur denied); Hotchkiss Liquor License Case, 169 Pa. Super. 506, 83 A.2d 398
(1951) ; see Weiss Liquor License Case, 187 Pa. Super. 89, 142 A.2d 385 (1958);
cf. Haase Liquor License Case, 184 Pa. Super. 356, 134 A.2d 682 (1957).
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recently the superior court in Club Oasis, Inc., Liquor License Case,145
has proposed as statutory authority for this practice the Administrative
Agency Law's requirement that a record be made including the reasons
and findings for all adjudications. 146 Although liquor board appeals are
not subject to the Administrative Agency Law's standards, 147 the court
held that procedures before the board itself are governed by the Administrative Agency Law,148 at least to the extent that the board must file an
opinion when an appeal is taken.
The courts' establishment of legal standards for the board through
their handling of statutory terms has generally comported with the legislative objectives. For example, some lower courts had held that a
"church" had to be a church building, and not merely a residence or other
building in which the congregation regularly met. 49 But in Her-Bell, Inc.,
Liquor License Case,150 the court, relying on state tax exemption cases,
held that the regular use of any building for church services classifies it
as a "church" under the Liquor Code.
The superior court has also given a broad construction to the term
"school." Thus "school" has been held to include students' residences
halls within the 300 foot area since the students had to walk to the school
proper, which was more than 300 feet from the licensed premises.151
"School" has also been interpreted to include the definitely planned site
of a school although the proposed license would expire before construction
was completed, since under existing law the license would almost certainly
be renewed.'x
Significantly, the court drew on New York and Illinois
cases to support its result.

53

Finally, in its most recent effort in this area,

the superior court has held that "school" included the property boundaries,
even though the school buildings were further than 300 feet from the site
of the proposed license.' T The school in this case was a resident institution and the surrounding land consisted in part of a farm used for the
rehabilitation of the children. The court relied on a similar case involving
a hospital, 55 correctly perceiving that the purpose of the 300 foot rule
does not depend solely on the location of the institution's buildings.
145
200 Pa. Super. 439, 188 A.2d 792 (1963).
46
1
PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 71, § 1710.34 (1962).
'47 Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.46 (1962),

with PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 47, § 4-464 (1952).
148 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-206 (1952).
'49 See, e.g., Appeal of Manheim Township Post No. 664 Am. Legion, 51 Lancaster 287 (Ct Quarter Sess. Lancaster County, Pa., 1949); It re Rogowski, 32
Erie 269 (Ct Quarter Sess. Erie County, Pa., 1949). But cf. Stehlik License, 67
Pa. D. & C. 276 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Philadelphia County 1949).
See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d
350 176 Pa. Super. 206, 107 A2d 572 (1954).
1439 (1958).
151 Clinton Management, Inc., Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 8, 145 A.2d
873 (1958)
(alternative holding).
152 DiRocco Liquor License Case, 167 Pa. Super. 381, 74 A.2d 501 (1950). See
generally Annot, 49 A.L.R.2d 1103 (1956).
153 DiRocco Liquor License Case, supra note 152, at 385-86, 74 A.2d at 503-04.
'54 Jack's Delicatessen, Inc., Liquor License Case, 202 Pa. Super. 481, 198 A.2d
604 (1964).
155 Lester Liquor License Case, 170 Pa. Super. 574, 87 A.2d 794 (1952).
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The handling of statutory terms has not, however, been without fault;
occasionally, the courts have interpreted the term "charitable institution"
even more broadly than was necessary to effectuate the statutory goals.
Thus the superior court has held that the presence of a volunteer fire company may preclude issuance of a liquor license for premises within 300
feet.' 56 The court reached this curious result by relying on the common
meanings of words and by citing cases defining fire companies as charities
for the purposes of preventing dissipation of their funds.157 The court
buttressed its conclusion by stressing the interference with the free movement of fire equipment that would be caused by the increased traffic
attracted by the licensed premises.' 58 If this reason has any plausibility,
it would seem more appropriately addressed to local zoning and traffic
authorities than to the state liquor control board. Consideration of the
other restrictive institutions listed in the statute--churches, hospitals,
schools, and public playgrounds-suggests a legislative purpose that only
those charities that would be particularly vulnerable to rowdy or indecent
behavior should be permitted to block the licensing of a nearby premise.
2. The 500 Foot Rule and the Effective Use of Allocatur
Another "distance rule" in the Liquor Code is that the board
shall refuse any application . . . if, in the board's opinion, such
.. license . . . would be detrimental to the welfare, health,

peace and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood within
a radius of five hundred feet of the place proposed to be licensed. 5 9
The birth of this legislation illustrates the value of judicious selection
and decision of cases by the supreme court under its allocatur jurisdiction.
Before the enactment of the above provision, the superior court, in
Obradovich Liquor License Case,") had affirmed both the board and the
lower court in their denial of a license transfer. The applicant was fully
qualified and the denial was based solely on the remonstrances of neighbors.
The board and the courts had supported their result with a questionable
interpretation of the statute that would have given the board discretion
to deny a transfer even though an original issuance in the same circumstances would have been mandatory. 6 1 The supreme court, 162 having taken
the case on allocatur, construed the statute to make both the transfer and
156 Subers Liquor License Case, 173 Pa. Super. 558, 98 A.2d 639 (1953) (allocatur denied); see Haase Liquor License Case, 175 Pa. Super. 618, 106 A2d 865
(1954).
157 See also In re Appeal of Subers, 40 Delaware 22, 23 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Delaware County, Pa., 1952).
158 See Subers Liquor License Case, 173 Pa. Super. 558, 98 A.2d 639 (1953)
(allocatur denied).
59
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964).
160 180 Pa. Super. 383, 119 A.2d 839, rev'd, 386 Pa. 342, 126 A.2d 435 (1956).
118See 180 Pa. Super. at 391-96, 119 A.2d at 84245 (dissenting opinion).
162 Obradovich Liquor License Case, 386 Pa. 342, 126 A.2d 435 (1956).

PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR LICENSING

the original issuance mandatory despite the protests of neighbors. Although
this construction was compelled by both the language of the provisions
involved and the broader statutory context, the court's opinion referred
the matter to the legislature to fill the obvious gap in the board's discretionary powers.1'
Probably recognizing the merit of the policy relied on by the board
and the lower courts, the legislature amended the statute to allow the
board to consider the deleterious effect of a license on the surrounding
neighborhood.' 4 Against an attack that this grant of discretion was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the court has subsequently
held that the detrimental effect on the nearby inhabitants is merely a "fact"
for the board alone to determine before the law is applied according to the
statute.1es
In a recent case the superior court sustained a board determination
that the transfer of a license would be detrimental to the welfare, health,
peace, and morals of the inhabitants within 500 feet of the proposed location.166 Since the quarter sessions court had also affirmed the board, the
case was not a satisfactory vehicle for testing the extent to which the
judiciary must defer to the board in its application of the 500 foot rule.
Nevertheless, the court stressed the board's discretionary power, suggesting
that board determinations will be accorded the judicial respect given to its
300 foot rule determinations.
B. Clubs and Resorts
1. Clubs
Since club licenses are subject to less stringent restrictions than are
restaurant or hotel licenses, 167 their unlimited issuance would undoubtedly
result in organizations whose primary aim is the sale of liquor and also
"one-man" clubs, which merely disguise an ordinary retail liquor operation
by charging a small "membership" fee.' 68 In order to prevent these
abuses, the Liquor Code contains a statutory definition of "club" that
requires regular meetings, dues, continuity of existence, and a primary
purpose other than the sale of liquor.' 69 A club may sell liquor only to its
161d.

at 348, 126 A.2d at 437-38.

64

Pa. Laws 1959, 746; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-404 (Supp. 1964); see
Gismondi Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 619, 186 A.2d 448 (1962) ; cf. 1621,
Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 108, 166 A.2d 271, 278 (1960) (picketing of taproom by
neighbors not enjoined) ; Reid v. Brodsky, 397 Pa. 463, 156 A.2d 334 (1959) (enjoin
-taproom as a nuisance at neighbors' insistence).
165 Tate Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 188, 193, 173 A.2d 657, 660 (1961).
'6SKoehler's Bar, Inc., Liquor License Case, 204 Pa. Super. 25, 201 A.2d 306
(1964) (allocatur denied).
1

167See PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 47, § 4-405 (1952),

as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

47, § 4-405(d) (Supp. 1964) (license fees) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-406 (Supp.
1964) (hours of operation).
168 See generally CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL WoRa

76-77 (1947) ; CHILDs, LIQuOR

UNDER CONTROL 85 (1960) ; Schoenfeld, supra note 108, at 163-67.
169 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1-102 (1952).
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members. 170 To prevent applicants from circumventing these standards
by a merely formal compliance with the Liquor Code's requirements, "the
board . . . in the case of a club may, in its discretion, issue or refuse
a license . . ." 171 even though all other requirements are met and the

license would be within the area quota.
The quota restrictions pertaining to club licenses further illuminate
the legislative attitude toward this type of license. The board cannot issue
a club license if the area quota is exceeded.'72 This restriction indicates
that the legislature wanted to limit the number of club licenses, even though
the liquor sold under them would not be generally distributed to the community. A club license, however, is not counted against the quota to
prevent issuance of a hotel or restaurant license. 7 3 This provision seems
to recognize that a club license is not the most effective way to fill a community's needs. Although most early lower court cases properly allowed
the board wide discretion in its disposition of applications for a club
license, 74 the board has always been obligated to explain its denial of a
75
seemingly valid application.'
2. Resorts
The quota law sets the maximum number of licenses in accordance
with the community's population. Nevertheless, since the quota is measured by permanent population, an exception was enacted with regard to
resort areas: "The board shall have the power to increase the number of
licenses in any such municipality which in the opinion of the board is
located within a resort area." T'8An exception to a quota, itself enacted
to restrain the liquor business, invites strict construction. The language
also suggests that the board's normal course of action might well be to deny
resort licenses, since it was given only the "power," not the duty, to
exceed the quota. Moreover, the phrasing seems to commit to the board
alone the determination whether a particular area is a resort for purposes
of disregarding the quota limits.
The courts have explained the guiding policy of the "resort" exception to be that licenses should be equitably distributed to accommodate
170 Carver Community Center Liquor License Case, 200 Pa. Super. 517, 522,
189 A.2d 914, 916 (1963).
171 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-404 (Supp. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
172 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (a) (Supp. 1964).
173 Ibid.
174 See, e.g., Log Cabin Rod & Gun Club License, 66 Pa. D. & C. 188 (Ct
Quarter Sess. Lebanon County 1948); Willow Grove Veterans Home Association's
Application, 61 Montgomery 223 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Montgomery County, Pa., 1945) ;
In re Appeal of San Marco Soc'y, 35 Berks 239 (Ct Quarter Sess. Berks County,
Pa., 1943). But see Appeal of Moxie Club. 50 Lackawanna 249 (Ct. Quarter Sess.
Lackawanna County, Pa., 1949) ; In re Geiger-Zimmerman VFW Home, Inc., Appeal,
41 Berks 177 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Berks County, Pa., 1949).
1' See William E. Burrell I.B.P.O.E. of W. Liquor License Case, 172 Pa. Super.
346, 94 A.2d 110 (1953).
76 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461(b) (1952).
(Emphasis added.)
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transients in areas with large seasonal population increases. 177 While such
an explanation of the legislative intent is surely within the court's province
of stating the "law" that controls the board's deliberations, the task of
sifting and weighing the facts bearing on whether any given area is a
"resort" should remain with the board. If an "abuse of discretion" standard is to govern court review, a board determination of "resort" status that
is reasonable in light of the legislative goals should not be reconsidered by
78

the courts.1

In addition, even if an area is found to be a resort, the license should
not issue unless it is needed to satisfy an unusual seasonal demand. In
accommodating these needs, the board, and the reviewing courts, should
assess the requirements of the locale and the usefulness of the type of facility
proposed to be licensed instead of automatically granting additional licenses
in a given resort area.17 9 The situation seems to be a particularly apt one
for the courts to defer somewhat to the expert agency's interpretation and
implementation of its regulatory statute. 80
3. Clubs in Resort Areas
Since the only purpose for the resort exception is to accommodate a
seasonal influx of transients, private clubs, which may serve only members,
177 See Bierman Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 200, 205, 145 A.2d 876,
879 (1958).
178 I can specifically recall one case where a resort area license was granted
to an applicant whose place of business was within a few blocks of an automobile junkyard, a quarry, huge culm piles and no recreational facilities whatsoever. The Board in preparing its case felt that the court could even take
judicial notice that the area was not a resort area but notwithstanding that
used photographs and oral testimony to prove the nature of the place. The
court then made its decision on the basis of oral testimony and as the factfinding agency had the right to make different findings of fact than the Board
made, did find that there were recreational facilities as a matter of law. The
record made by the Board was inadequate for an appeal and the Board had
to change its entire program of licensing.
Letter From Robert H. Jordan, Esquire, Former Attorney for the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, March, 1964.
See Andes Grove Rod & Gun Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 21, 25,
190 A.2d 355, 357 (1963); Willowbrook Country Club, Inc., Liquor License Case,
409 Pa. 370, 376, 187 A.2d 154, 157 (1962) (dissenting opinion); cf. Symons v.
National Elec. Prods., Inc., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 112, 121-22 (C.P. Beaver County
1962), aff'd per curiam, 201 Pa. Super. 27, 192 A.2d 897 (1963), aff'd, 414 Pa. 505,
200 A.2d 871 (1964).
See also Kreiser Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 206,
145 A.2d 880 (1958); Bierman Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Super. 200, 145 A.2d
876 (1958); Blue Mountain Country Club License, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 37 (C.P. Perry
County 1956) ; Lance License, 83 Pa. D. & C. 150 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Susquehanna
County 1952). But see Minnichbach License, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 749 (Ct. Quarter
Sess. Pike County 1961) ; Appeal of Elkview Country Club, 56 Lackawanna 32 (Ct.
Quarter Sess. Lackawanna County, Pa., 1954).
179 See William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super.
519, 523, 175 A.2d 908, 910 (1961); Minnichbach License, 24 D. & C.2d 749 (Ct.
Quarter Sess. Pike County 1961); Greene-Dreher Legion Home License, 69 Pa.
D. & C. 425 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Pike County 1949). But see In re Appeal of Panco,
42 Luzerne 58 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Luzerne County, Pa., 1951) (quarter sessions court
granted license although quota of three was exceeded by eighteen).
180 See generally DAvis, ADMIxISTRATivE LAW TEXT §§ 30.09-.11 (1959).
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are the least appropriate outlets to fill the need. 181 An applicant for a club
license in excess of quota in an area alleged to be a resort thus should have
to overcome three statutory hurdles-the board's general discretion to deny
a club license and its possible determinations either that the license is not
needed in the area or that the area is not even a resort. The courts should
be correspondingly reluctant to overturn the board's denial of a license.
Since an additional club license in a resort may have affirmative value in
alleviating a seasonal strain on local facilities, the presumption against
its issuance may not be as strong as that present in the case of premises
within 300 feet of a restrictive institution. 8 2 But certainly substantial
weight should be given to the board's decision against a resort club license.
However, despite the obstacles presented by the combined statutory
barriers against "club" and "resort area" licenses, the courts have been
unusually generous to applicants for club licenses in resort areas.183 The
reason is that in reviewing these appJications, the courts have frequently
lost sight of the judicially defined goal of the legislation-the equitable
distribution of licenses to accommodate great seasonal increases in population. Furthermore, in this area, even the appellate courts often appear
to give little weight to the board's decisions or to the board's broader role
in administering the Liquor Code.
The stress on seasonal population shifts in defining a "resort"
should make irrelevant the nature of the "resort's" recreational facilities,
provided the inflow of visitors is substantial and predictable. Thus, the
fact that the only attractions are picnicking and clambakes, or hunting and
fishing, should not prevent an area from being a "resort" if enough vacationers regularly visit it. Yet some opinions have given weight to the
nature of the recreational facilities.184 Conversely, even when facilities
of "resort-quality" have been only under construction, the courts have
ignored the possibility that their incomplete stage of development may not
yet warrant the grant of additional licenses. 185 An appellate court has also
181 See Blue Mountain Country Club License, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 37, 45-46 (C.P.
Perry County 1956); cf. Greene-Dreher Legion Home License, 75 Pa. D. & C. 84
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Pike County 1951). But see Riegelsville Legion Home Liquor
License Case, 86 Pa. D. & C. 309 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Bucks County 1953).
182 See 425-429, Inc., Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 116 A.2d 79
(1955) (allocatur denied) ; see note 138 supra and accompanying text.
183 See, e.g., Wildwood Golf Club Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 353, 185
A.2d 649 (1962) (allocatur denied) ; Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License
Case, 198 Pa. Super, 242, 181 A.2d 698, affd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962);
Mannitto Haven Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 524, 175 A.2d 911 (1961);
William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 519, 175 A.2d
908 (1961); Riegelsville Legion Home Liquor License Case, 86 Pa. D. & C. 309
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Bucks County 1953).
184 See Andes Grove Rod & Gun Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 21,
190 A.2d 355, 356 (1963) (allocatur denied); Appeal of Sunseri, 22 Cambria 96
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Cambria County, Pa., 1959); Steigerwalt License, 14 Pa. D. &
C.2d 614 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Schuylkill County 1958).
185 See Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 198 Pa. Super. 242,
181 A.2d 698, aff'd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962); William Penn Sportsmen's
Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 519, 175 A.2d 908 (1961). But cf. Appeal
of Sunseri, 22 Cambria 96, 102-03 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Cambria County, Pa., 1959).
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held that an area will not be deemed a resort if the sole attraction derives
from the applicant club's own facilities and activities. 8 6 The merit of this
position is undeniable if the club's membership is static and is drawn only
from the neighborhood of the club, but the court denied resort status to
a club with 331 family memberships that attracted about 25,000 guests
during the summer months.'8 7 The grounds for denial were that the surrounding area was predominantly residential, and not a resort area.
The viewpoint of the court may have derived from the many cases
granting licenses to clubs because they adjoined other resort facilities. 88
But these decisions seem likewise to pervert the policy of the resort exception, for they concentrate only on the resort characteristics of the surrounding area while largely disregarding the fact that a club license is often
the least efficient way to satisfy increased seasonal demand with a minimum
of licenses in excess of quota. Once an area is found to qualify for additional liquor licenses under the quota law's resort exception, policy judgments regarding the number and type of additional licenses must be made
upon consideration of the seasonal increase in population and the capacity
of nearby facilities.'8 9 These factors make each case unique, and thus seem
even less appropriate for redetermination by the courts than is an area's
"resort" classification. 19
Yet, the reviewing courts have repeatedly
reversed the board on these issues.'"" The board has been consistently
unable to prevail with its contention that a club license is the least likely
to satisfy the needs of the area's seasonal transient population, since the
clubs may serve only members and their guests. 192 The courts generally
have countered by pointing to the large numbers of vacationers attracted
to surrounding areas, without recognizing the essential irrelevance of
this circumstance since the club will probably never serve them. One
opinion expressed the fear that affirming the board on this issue would
186 See Riviera Country Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 70, 191 A.2d
725 (1963); Blue Mountain Country Club License, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 37 (C.P. Perry
County 1956) (dictum).
187 Riviera Country Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 70, 191 A.2d 725
(1963). But cf. Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 198 Pa. Super.
242, 181 A.2d 698, aff'd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962) (area with 5,000 to 6,000
yearly visitors entitled to resort status).
188 See, e.g., Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, s'pra note
187; William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 519,
175 A.2d 908 (1961).
189 See, e.g., Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 409 Pa. 370,
374-75, 187 A.2d 154 (1962); Appeal of Elkview Country Club, 56 Lackawanna 32
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Lackawanna County, Pa., 1954).
190 Cf. Symons v. National Elec. Prods., Inc., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 112 (C.P. Beaver
County 1962), aff'd per curiam, 201 Pa. Super. 27, 172 A.2d 897 (1963), aff'd, 414
Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964) (existence of disability under Workmen's Compensation
Act is a question of fact for the board and is not reviewable in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion). See generally DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 30.11 (1959).
191 See authorities cited note 183 supra.
192 See, e.g., Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 409 Pa. 370,
374, 187 A.2d 154, 156 (1962) ; William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case,
196 Pa. Super. 519, 522-23, 175 A.2d 908, 910 (1961). But see Greene-Dreher Legion
Home License, 75 Pa. D. & C. 84, 86 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Pike County 1951).
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forever preclude club licenses in resort areas. 193 However, the courts
could easily distinguish for favorable treatment those situations in which
the visitors who account for the increase in the resort area's population
are themselves the members of the club.' 94
Finally, the decisions are plagued by recurring considerations that
border on the irrelevant and that consequently can only serve to mislead
attorneys and judges who refer to them in future cases. For example,
substantial investment in club facilities should not weigh in favor of
granting a club license, since the club members should have been aware
of the obstacles to getting a liquor license when they initiated the undertaldng.195 Similarly, the fact that club members feel ill at ease in other
local establishments, 196 while perhaps relevant to the issuance of a club
license, would not seem to justify granting them a club license in excess
of quota. Finally, laborious descriptions of the history of the region 197
and the nature of nearby recreational facilities 198 seem unnecesesary except
as they bear on the magnitude of the seasonal population increase.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did little to effectuate the statutory

policies when it decided Willowbrook Country Club Liquor License Case199
on allocatur.
noted:

In ruling that the area in question was a "resort," the court

Under the undisputed facts, there is an unusual and great influx
of people into this particular area during certain seasons of the

year. It is quite obvious to us that the character and number of
the usual licenses could not possibly meet the existing need.200
The "unusual and great influx of people" was in fact only 5,000 to 6,000
over the course of the season, and the quota for the area was already
m
exceeded by three.
"' Hence, under the existing statutory formula of one
' 9 3 Wildwood Golf Club Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 353, 360, 185 A.2d
649, 653 (1962) (allocatur denied).
'94 See, e.g., Mannitto Haven Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 524, 175 A.2d
911 (1961); William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super.
519, 175 A.2d 908 (1961); Appeal of Elkview Country Club, 56 Lackawanna 32
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Lackawanna County, Pa., 1954).
195 See, e.g., Riviera Country Club Liquor License Case, 201 Pa. Super. 70, 191
A.2d 725 (1963); Vittorio Emanuele III Club Case, 22 Westmoreland 213, 218
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Westmoreland County, Pa., 1939); cf. Reid v. Brodsky, 397 Pa.
463, 466 n.3, 156 A.2d 334, 337 n.3 (1959). But cf. Willowbrook Country Club, Inc.
Liquor License Case, 198 Pa. Super. 242, 181 A.2d 698, aff'd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d
154 (1962).
196 See Aqua Club Liquor License Case, 202 Pa. Super. 192, 195, 195 A.2d 802,
804 (1963) (allocatur denied); Riegelsville Legion Home Liquor License Case, 86
Pa. D. & C. 309, 318 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Bucks County 1953).
197 See Wildwood Golf Club Liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 353, 185 A.2d
649 (1962) (allocatur denied).
198 See, e.g., Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 198 Pa. Super.
242, 181 A.2d 698, aff'd, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962); Windber Country Club
License, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (Ct. Quarter Sess. Cambria County 1963).
199 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962).
200 Id. at 373, 187 A.2d at 155.
201 198 Pa. Super. at 243-44, 181 A.2d at 699.
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license for each 1500 inhabitants,2 0 2 it is hardly "quite obvious" that the
existing facilities were inadequate. The supreme court thus followed the
lower courts' unsatisfactory practice of not demonstrating how the facts
of the case bring it within the policy of the properly stated general rule.
The court did not acknowledge the board's contention before the superior
court 20 3 that the area was not yet sufficiently developed to be classified as

a resort.
In Willowbrook the board had argued that a catering club license 204
is not the best vehicle for satisfying a resort area's increased demand. 0
The supreme court answered by quoting an oft-repeated 20 6 dictum that
anomalously seems to facilitate the granting of club licenses in resort areas:
The term "actual necessity" in determining the need for a liquor
license [in a resort area] will be given a broad construction so as
to mean substantial need in relation to the pleasure, convenience
20 7
and general welfare of the persons who make use of the facility.
In this instance the court at least referred to the relevant circumstance that
all nearby taverns were too small to accommodate Willowbrook's membership. 0 8 However, it did not mention that the club's membership of
465 209 constituted less than ten percent of the 5,000 to 6,000 yearly inflow.
By stressing the needs of the club members, rather than that of the resort
area, the court seems to have thwarted both the statutory policy and the
board's efforts to issue only those licenses best calculated to satisfy the
demand which initially warranted exceeding the quota.
CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania appellate courts' review of liquor board decisions
has been of uneven quality. The courts have generally limited quarter
sessions courts' scope of review more than might have been necessary
under the controlling statute, although at times-particularly in the instance
of resort clubs-they have delved into more detail than their professed
"abuse of discretion" standard should have permitted. The tendency to
limit review may represent an attempt to modify the statutory pattern
2 02

203

officer).
20

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (a) (Supp. 1964).
See 198 Pa. Super. at 246, 181 A.2d at 700 (testimony of board enforcement

4 A catering club, in addition to serving members, may serve groups of nonmembers that use the facilities of the club by prior arrangement made at least tventyfour hours in advance. PENxsYLvANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD REGULATIONS § 113.11
(1965).
205 409 Pa. at 374, 187 A.2d at 156.
208 See, e.g., Mannitto Haven Liquor License Case, 196 Pa. Super. 524, 175
A.2d 911 (1961); William Penn Sportsmen's Ass'n Liquor License Case, 196 Pa.
Super. 519, 175 A2d 908 (1961).
207 409 Pa. at 375, 187 A.2d at 158.
208 Ibid.
209 See 198 Pa. Super. at 245, 181 A.2d at 700.
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allowing the quarter sessions courts of each county to redetermine licensing
questions, a practice which carries the risk of disregarding the viewpoints
and prior decisions of the board and of other lower courts. The frequent
lack of attention to scope of review issues and other matters of broad
policy may possibly be attributed to lax presentation of counsel.
Undoubtedly, the appellate courts reach reasonable results in the
great majority of cases. Whether this is because of or in spite of their
prior decisions is less clear. Liquor licensing opinions have too often
been sprinkled with misleading dicta, improper citation of authority, misapplication of statutory policies, and disregard of controlling statutory
language. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whether because of oversight or press of business, has ventured into the area of liquor licensing
too infrequently, and then with only mixed results that do not represent
the most effective use of its discretionary jurisdiction. Appellate opinions
in this area need more care and analysis before they can achieve maximum
guidance for the board, the lower courts, and the bar while remaining
within the confines of appropriate judicial process.
Richard A. Jacoby t
t LL.B. 1964, University of Pennsylvania.
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